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Abstract 
 Consumers of news care both about the novelty of the news they read, as well as how popular 
that news topic is with others. Editors choose what to report on based on consumer preferences 
and the coverage of their competitors. We build a continuous time model that predicts whether 
news providers invest in covering novel news stories or instead report on popular. We construct a 
dataset of cover stories to test the model and find that both novelty and popularity are associated 
with increased sales, but popular stories only have a lifespan of one to two weeks. We find that 
the impact of novelty has declined since 2006, and the lifespan of a story has shortened. While 
theory predicts that editors strategically alternate between reporting on novel stories and popular 
stories, we find evidence of positive serial correlation in the popularity of cover stories. Finally, 
news outlets often cover the same story. Theory predicts that competitive news outlets are more 
likely to pool on the stories they cover while news outlets with market power are more likely to 
separate. 
 
Keywords: news media, popularity, novelty, cover stories, herd journalism 
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Herd Journalism: Investment in Novelty and Popularity in Markets for News 
 
 Consumer preferences for the novelty and the popularity of news stories affect the 
investment decisions by news providers. Editors must decide which news events they should 
cover, and how that coverage depends on the coverage of their competitors. A novel story is 
characterized as breaking news, a story on a topic about which the news consumer was 
previously unaware. A popular story is a story that many people already know about due to past 
coverage by other news outlets. A news story is valuable to consumers both because it provides 
new information, but also because it provides information that everybody is talking about—i.e. it 
follows the herd. We show that novel stories and popular stories are associated with higher sales, 
with the optimal lifespan of a story being just one to two weeks. We model how news firms 
choose which stories to cover in relation to the novelty and popularity of stories they have 
covered in the past and in relation to the novelty and popularity of the news covered by their 
competitors.  
 Our model of news production is a continuous time model where competing news 
providers make investment decisions about which news events to cover at regular time intervals. 
Consumers base their consumption decisions on the novelty and the popularity of the stories 
being offered. We then take the model to the data. The main approach will be to look at the 
choice of cover stories of the most popular weekly newsmagazines and how that choice is 
associated with newsstand sales. Specifically we measure the novelty and popularity of magazine 
cover stories and the similarity of coverage between competitors. 
 Much recent research on the news media has asked whether the industrial organization of 
the news industry affects the bias in the news consumers receive (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008; 
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Anderson and Coate, 2005), providing policy implications on the effects of media consolidation. 
Theoretical models (Mullainathan and Schleifer, 2005; Chiang and Knight, 2011) and empirical 
studies (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Galvis et al., 2012) find that media bias can be explained 
by profit maximizing firms adapting their product to satisfy the political leanings of their 
customers. 
 We ask a complementary question: what determines the content of news coverage in 
terms of the trade-off between covering something novel
1
 and covering something popular. 
Franceschelli (2011) shows that a one-day delay in reporting of a breaking news story by 
newspapers in Argentina led to a 65% reduction in readership, and that this preference for speed 
increased as news transitioned online. On the other hand, news outlets may instead choose to 
cover an older topic simply because it is currently popular in the public mindset. When Time 
magazine covered a feature story on the morality of Jesus one week, the same story was covered 
in other outlets in following weeks. Stories involving the kidnapping of one particular girl often 
take a life of their own. This practice of covering what is popular is widely termed herd 
journalism or pack journalism. 
 The study of the popularity of herds has a substantial theoretical provenance in 
economics (Bernheim, 1994; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Pesendorfer, 1995; Karni and 
Schmeidler, 1990) with substantial empirical evidence through field experiments showing that 
people are more likely to consume something when it is more popular (e.g. Duflo and Saez, 
2003; Beshears et al., 2011). While much of this literature has focused on the incentive to 
conform to what is popular, a more recent literature has noted that individuals sometimes choose 
                                                          
1
 As a precursor to the current study, we conducted a preliminary survey of 63 people chosen from a national sample 
through the Study Response Project and found that out of seven news provider attributes (local relevant, style, 
alignment of political views, speed of coverage, quantity of advertising, accuracy, other), speed of coverage (rated 
3.2 out of 4) was second most important to consumers, second only to accuracy (3.7 out of 4). 
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to diverge from the herd (Heath et al., 2006). Amaldoss and Jain (2010) calls the desire to be 
unique a snob effect, while Brewer (1991) discusses the innate preference for optimal 
distinctiveness. Both of these papers discuss a similar trade off to the one that newspapers face: 
how to be distinct while also conforming to what is popular. 
 Our empirical approach follows the content analysis approach that has grown out of 
computer science. Wu and Huberman (2008) observes user behavior on digg.com, a website that 
aggregates news stories from other news providers to estimate the influence of novelty, 
popularity, and attention on digg.com users’ demand for news. Leskovec et al. (2009) employ a 
computational intensive approach to identify how certain linguistic phrases (‘‘memes’’) spread 
from news outlets to blogs. Their approach has been widely adopted in the computer science 
literature to examine diffusion in online social networks (Gomez Rodriguez et al., 2010) or the 
influence of Twitter on the news (Kwak et al., 2010; Hong, 2012). Our focus here is on 
competition and market structure and employ a more straightforward and less computationally 
demanding approach by using the keyword descriptors provided by the news aggregator service 
Proquest to classify news stories. 
 The ultimate goal of this project is to understand how consumer demand for novelty and 
popularity affects the amount of innovation for news. Coverage of novel news is particularly 
important for maintaining an informed electorate in a democracy. While recent economic 
research has shown that political bias in news media has little effect on voting (Gentzkow et al., 
2011; Prior, 2013), we are interested in how well the news media keeps the public informed. 
 As in the literature on media bias, we are interested in the effect of market structure, 
particularly as the rise of online news has led to the collapse of traditional print media. The 
baseline theoretical framework models ‘‘small’’ media firms that take public attention on a topic 
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as exogenous, just as small firms take prices as exogenous.
2
 Additionally, in the appendix, we 
consider extending the model to firms with market power in the market for attention. Empirically 
we find that the role of novelty in generating magazine sales has largely faded since 2006, and 
the lifespan of how long a popular story can generate higher sales has fallen. The lifespan of a 
story was one to two weeks before 2006, falling to under one week after. How much of this 
decline can be attributed to the rise of online news (Hong, 2010; Simon and Kadiyali, 2007), 
versus market consolidation within the news magazine industry (Anderson and Coate, 2005; 
George, 2007) cannot be separately identified. 
 Part of the difficulty in our analysis is measuring the novelty and popularity of news 
events. We approach this problem in two ways: through an analysis of keywords, and by having 
present day readers evaluate the titles of cover stories in the past. While each measure has its 
own problems, the combination of the two offers a more complete picture. To assess measures of 
novelty, popularity, and similarity, we evaluate keywords by comparing the keywords the news 
magazines chose to cover, with the frequency of coverage of those same words in a national 
sample of 64 newspapers in the same week. We validated these measures by having workers—
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—rate each article (or pair of articles) on the same 
measures of novelty, popularity and similarity. 
  
                                                          
2
 Here, we use the term ‘‘small’’ in the technical sense as it is used in the theoretical international trade literature, 
which for convenience sake sometimes even models the United States as ‘‘small.’’ We acknowledge that the firms 
we are analyzing are the two largest news magazines (that is why they were chosen), and therefore they arguably do 
have agenda setting power in deciding what is popular. We discuss how this would change the model in the 
appendix but leave a fuller analysis to future research. Also, assuming a larger market definition of all news 
providers (the internet, newspapers, cable news), the market share of these magazines are small. 
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Theoretical framework 
 We motivate our empirical findings with a novel theoretical framework to better 
understand the economic motivations for how editors select stories vis-a-vis their competitors. 
While most theories of news content focus on the choice of political bias, we focus on the firm’s 
investment in either novel or popular news coverage. Doing so helps us understand the 
motivations of the news providers and the welfare consequences for consumers. 
 We begin by assuming that firms can only publish one news story in any given period 
(for example, magazines only print one cover story) and firms take popularity to be exogenous 
(as if they behaved as if they were a small player in the marketplace of media attention). 
Consumes care about both the novelty and popularity of the stories they consume, and can only 
choose to consume a single news magazine due to limits to their attention as in Falkinger (2007). 
For simplicity we assume the price and marginal cost of a magazine is equal to zero and that 
firms are supported by advertising. Thus firms simply seek to maximize the number of 
consumers who choose their product.
3
 
 We assume the novelty of a given story decays over time. Firms therefore find it is 
optimal to either publish the newest news, or to publish older news at the point where the decline 
in novelty stops being offset by a story’s high popularity. Whether a firm chooses the most novel 
story or the most popular story depends on whether the rate of change of popularity in the current 
period is above or below a given threshold that depends on the rate of novelty decay and the 
consumer’s elasticity of substitution between novelty and popularity. 
 The model also predicts that a news provider will tend to follow a novel story in one 
week with a popular story the following week and vice versa. This is because when the firm 
                                                          
3
 Of course papers may have other preferences. See for example Fan (2013), Gal-Or (2012), Geylani and Yildirim 
(2011) for models with multi-channel revenue streams. 
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chooses a novel story, regression to the mean implies that the rate of change in popularity will 
likely be low the next week. Alternatively, when the firm chooses the most popular story to 
cover, the rate of change in popularity will likely be high in the following week. 
 
General setup of the market for news game 
 Consider a continuous time model where there are two firms who face a continuum of 
consumers. Each firm offers a single bundle of news stories. Consumers choose to consume one 
firm’s bundle. We assume the price of both goods equals zero; firms are implicitly supported by 
advertising, and we assume firm profits are proportional to their market share. 
At each integer time,     , consumers choose to consume the bundle produced by a single firm 
(we effectively assume attention constraints prevent them from consuming both). Consumer 
utility is a function of the novelty of the news they consume, the popularity of the news they 
consume, as well as some random noise term. 
 There is a novel potential news event at every time         ; we will use the variable   
as an index to refer to these news events where         . We assume the novelty at time t of 
news event   is given by       and declines exponentially with time. The popularity       of 
that news story will depend on the share of people who consume the news story. 
 While news events occur in real time t, news providers only offer bundles of news stories 
at integer values. At each integer time           , each news provider, i, offers a bundle of 
news stories       where a bundle consists of a set of events covered, and a function       which 
specifies the quantity of coverage for each story (alternatively one can think of q quality). The 
provider is constrained by space so that         . Thus choice of coverage of any one news 
story has a cost in terms of opportunity cost of other stories not covered. At each time t, each 
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consumer chooses one news provider, choosing based on the novelty and the popularity of the 
news stories within the bundles offered. There is a unit mass of consumers. News consumers’ 
preferences are given by the sum of their felicity functions          from the consumption of 
news in each period. We assume discount rate of 1 for simplicity and that felicity is a stationary 
function that depends only on the novelty and popularity associated with each news event plus 
    
  weighted by quantity of coverage. Heterogeneity of news consumer is given by     
 , an i.i.d. 
mean zero noise term which follows distribution     . We can now write utility as 
(1) 
             
 
   
 
                                   
  
      
 
 
 News providers face zero costs and charge zero price but they are constrained by space. 
At any time t, firms simultaneously choose which events they wish to report on. Profits are 
strictly increasing in market share and are additively separable across time periods. We will 
consider sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium. 
 The assumption that there are no producer costs in the model is not completely 
innocuous. While the actual cost of investigative journalism to cover breaking news has been 
much discussed, our contention is that for a major news outlet, the marginal cost of hiring a 
reporter to cover breaking news versus hiring a reporter to write about popular news is small 
relative to the opportunity cost of not covering a story that would have brought in higher sales. In 
the data presented here, a one standard deviation increase in the popularity of the news story 
covered brings in an extra 100,000 issues of newsstand sales alone. The impact of that decision 
on revenue arguably outweighs the impact of hiring an extra reporter. 
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 From this framework, we can derive some basic results. To better match the cover story 
data we analyze, and for expositional simplicity, we consider the special case where firms choose 
to report on only one event in each period. However, the appendix contains derivations for the 
more general model where firms divide their reporting resources across all possible events of the 
day. 
 
Analysis of base case 
 Consider first the simplest model where at any time t each firm is limited to reporting on 
a single event               rather than a set. Also, for now, we assume that popularity is an 
exogenously given function       differentiable in t. Essentially, we assume that firms are small 
enough in the market for news that their choices have no effect on the popularity of a news story. 
We consider extensions that endogenize popularity by assuming firms are big enough to the 
affect popularity of a news story by their investments rather than being simply ‘‘popularity-
takers’’ in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 1. In the Market for News with homogeneous consumers when popularity is 
exogenous to firm choice, firms pool on the same strategy and report on the event with novelty 
and popularity that maximizes consumer utility. 
 The proof for this and all propositions are found in the appendix. 
 The proposition suggests that each firm’s choice of story should not depend on 
competitor’s choice. While this proposition depends upon and follows directly from our 
assumptions that firm choices have no effect on future popularity and thus no effect on future 
profits, as well as the separability and independence assumptions of consumer utility, it offers a 
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testable prediction that we can use to test the model. Evidence that firms respond to competitors 
choices would suggest either that the exogeneity assumption is violated, and that the firms do 
have ‘‘market power’’ in determining popularity or there is separation due to consumer 
preferences. This pooling behavior is common to two player uni-dimensional Hotelling models 
like ours. 
 A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that we can think of the firm i’s problem at a 
given time t to simply report on the event   that maximizes consumer utility: 
(2) 
                                          
 
Proposition 2. In the Market for News with exogenous popularity and homogeneous consumers, 
if consumer preferences for popularity and novelty are first-order homogeneous Cobb-Douglas 
                 , then firms either choose the most novel story (t = s) or choose to report 
on the story at a point where the relative rate of change between popularity and novelty equals a 
constant: 
(3) 
  
  
   
    
   
 
 
  
 If we further assume novelty to be exponential that decays at rate    where        = 
        such that 
 
 
 =  – then we can characterize an interior solution as the point where 
(4) 
  
 
     
    
 
  
 
In other words, firms either pursue a novel strategy where they choose to cover the newest story 
available, or if instead they choose to pursue a popular strategy where they choose to report on 
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an older story at the point where the decrease in novelty is offset by the increase in popularity 
weighted by how much the consumer values popularity relative to novelty. Eq. (4) allows an 
estimate of the relative weight consumers place on novelty relative to popularity. 
 
Proposition 3. In the Market for News with Cobb-Douglas utility and exponential novelty decay, 
if firms choose to report on the most novel story        then the rate of increase in popularity 
at today’s date   must be weakly higher than in the case of a non-novel story. 
 This proposition follows from standard maximization conditions, that in order for the 
corner solution to be optimal, consumer utility from consuming the most current news story at 
time   must be higher than consuming a story at time       i.e. the first order condition must be 
weakly positive. When firms report on the most novel news story, the rate of increase in 
popularity at the current time   must be higher than when they report on an older story. 
 Under this framework, if popularity follows a mean reverting process than firms should 
follow reporting on novel stories but less popular stories with less novel but more popular stories 
and vice versa. We will look for this oscillation in the data. 
 There are no firm costs in this model and the firms play a zero sum game, so welfare only 
depends on consumer utility, and is maximized here because consumer utility is maximized. 
However, if we consider the extension in the appendix where utility is increased when there is 
greater investment in coverage of a particular story, then society would do better when there is 
more diverse coverage of the news. 
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Empirical strategy 
 To bring the model to data, we are going to think of each news event as a keyword, see 
Table 1 for the most popular keywords in our dataset. We will track the popularity of each 
keyword amongst the general public by tracking the frequency of those words in a set of 64 of 
the most popular US newspapers from the ProQuest database. We are primarily interested in how 
the novelty and popularity of these keywords influence the cover story selection of the main 
weekly newsmagazines: Time, Newsweek and US News and World Reports. 
 A key concept from the model is the influence of news organizations in the market for 
attention. The model makes predictions about the behavior of news organizations when they are 
‘‘small,’’ i.e. their choice of news coverage does not affect the future popularity of that keyword. 
We can use these predictions to look for market influence in the data. 
 We take two strategies to analyze the importance of novelty and popularity in cover story 
selection. The first will employ a semantic analysis of real world news content by examining 
their keywords. The second will use user ratings of novelty, popularity and similarity using 
workers recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. 
 
The data 
 The news cover stories are from three national news weekly magazines: Time, 
Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report.
4
 The sample contains 1655 cover stories published 
from February 2001 to August 2009 (615 from Time, 549 from Newsweek, and 491 from U.S. 
                                                          
4
  In June 2008, the U.S. News & World Report switched its publication frequency from weekly to biweekly. 
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News & World Report
5
). Each observation of a cover story contains the following information: 
title, author, keywords, and type (people, geographic or subject). In addition, we obtained 
Circulation Data from the Audit Bureau of Circulations, and include both weekly magazine 
subscriptions and newsstand sales. Our analysis will focus on single copy newsstand sales as we 
did not have sufficient power to detect the impact of cover story selection on future changes in 
weekly subscribers. 
 These three magazines are the top three in market share in the news magazine market in 
the US and together dominate the news weekly market (see Figs. 1a and 1b). Some of our 
analysis will focus only on Time and Newsweek as they both sell significantly more than US 
News, especially in the single copy sales market, and since US News exited the newsweekly 
market in 2008 by switching to a biweekly format. We will take advantage of this shift in market 
structure to look for market structure effects (see Fig. 2). 
 To measure the popularity and novelty of each cover story, we take two approaches: (1) 
an analysis of the keywords employed, (2) coding of article titles using an internet subject pool. 
 To analyze the keywords, we count the number of articles in daily newspapers that 
covered the same topic (keyword) in previous weeks. We match each keyword (as indexed by 
ProQuest) using the ProQuest publication database. ProQuest is an online database that indexes 
articles from more than 9600 publications. We count the number of times each keyword appears 
in one of the 64 most popular newspapers indexed by ProQuest, a list of which can be found in 
the Appendix.
6
 
 Each keyword from a magazine’s cover story was matched into the newspaper 
                                                          
5
  There was some missing data in the sample. In addition, some issue has more than one cover story. Or had special 
issues above and beyond the 52 weeks of the year. 
6
  We chose those 64 newspapers based on three Inclusion Criteria: (1) Ranked in the top 100 U.S. Newspaper 
ranking by average weekday readership. (Scarborogh Research, release 2, 2006). (2) Newspaper title contains the 
name of one of the 15 most populous U.S. states (3) General newspapers. Newspaper title contains at least one of the 
following: times, daily, news, post, journal, tribune, herald, observer, or press). 
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database and we counted the number of articles categorized by ProQuest that used that keyword. 
We calculate weekly popularity for two weeks prior to the delivery date of each issue and up to 
three weeks after.
7
 
 The popularity of a magazine cover story will be the number of articles that appeared in 
the ProQuest newspaper database that are classified with the keywords identified for the 
magazine cover story. The popularity variables we use include: 
1. POPW-2 - The number of related newspaper articles found in ProQuest published 
between 14 days before the magazine delivery date and 7 days before the magazine 
delivery date. 
2. POPW-1 - The number of related newspaper articles found in ProQuest published 
between 7 days before the magazine delivery date and the day before the magazine 
delivery date. 
3. POPW - The number of related newspaper articles found in ProQuest published between 
the magazine delivery date, and 7 days after. 
4. POPW+1 - The number of related newspaper articles found in ProQuest published 
between 7 days after the magazine delivery date and 14 days after. 
5. POPW+2 - The number of related newspaper articles found in ProQuest published 
between 14 days after the magazine delivery date and 21 days after. 
We measure the novelty in the following two ways: 
1. The inverse of the frequency that keyword appears in our dataset (high frequency 
occurrence means low novelty). 
2. The change in popularity in the previous week. Specifically, the popularity score in week 
T - 1 divided by the popularity score in week T - 2.
8
 
                                                          
7
  Normally the delivery date is 6 days before the printed issue date for all three magazines. 
16 
 
 Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The popularity scores are very similar across 
weeks, though there is a statistically significant peak in popularity in W - 1 the week before that 
keyword is chosen, with popularity in the week the cover story is published, W, coming in 
second. 
 We validate the keyword analysis by recruiting workers to code the articles based on 
article titles. Workers were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk rating system, and paid 
2 cents each to rate an article or pair of articles.
9
 Articles were rated twice to allow us to cross 
validate ratings. Each worker was shown the article title and the ProQuest keywords associated 
with that article and then asked the following questions: 
(1) On a scale of 1-5 (1 being least and 5 being most), how novel is the following cover story 
title (in bold) with relevant keywords, if any (listed below the title). 
(2) On a scale of 1-5 (1 being least and 5 being most), how newsworthy is the following 
cover story title (in bold) with relevant keywords, if any (listed below the title). 
(3) On a scale of 1-5 (1 being least and 5 being most), how interesting is the following cover 
story title (in bold) with relevant keywords, if any (listed below the title). 
(4) Please compare the similarity between the following cover stories titles (in bold) with 
relevant keywords, if any (listed below the title), on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 being 
least and 5 being most). 
 Different workers answered the novelty, newsworthiness, interestingness and similarity 
questions for each article or in the case of similarity, each article pair. Table 3 regresses the 
survey responses on our keyword based measures of novelty and popularity. While assessments 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
 We considered many other variants of changes in popularity scores, they largely yielded similar results. 
9
 The use of MTurk to recruit experimental subjects has been growing in economics research. See for example, 
Horton et al. (2011) who cross validated experimental results in the Harvard lab with results obtained from MTurk 
using standard economic games. 
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of novelty and popularity years after the fact are certainly prone to measurement error, Table 3 
shows that these measures had at least some explanatory power, and such measures are very 
plausibly exogenous for our IV estimations. 
 
Results 
 Linear regression analyses can be found in Tables 4-7. Table 4 takes the keyword as the 
unit of analysis. Each observation is a keyword, and we regress the single copy newsstand sales 
of the magazines associated with a cover story featuring that keyword in a given week, on the 
popularity of that keyword in surrounding weeks. Column 2 adds in measures for the novelty of 
that keyword based on frequency of that keyword in the dataset, and based on the change of 
popularity for that word from the prior week. Year, and month controls to account for cyclicality 
of the news cycle were added for column 3 and 4. In terms of the theoretical framework, each 
observation can be thought of as a news event selected for the cover story. Most weeks have 
multiple keywords, so standard errors are clustered at the issue level. It is notable that all 
specifications, even the ones without fixed effects, have a surprisingly good fit with adjusted R-
squared ranging from 0.64 to 0.69. 
 The popularity of these keywords in other media prove to be very good predictors of 
sales success; a one standard deviation increase in popularity increases weekly newsstand sales 
by 20%. However, attention seems to be limited to one to two weeks. Stories that were popular 
the week of and the week prior increased sales, but stories that were popular two weeks prior to 
publication, were associated with lower sales today. Similarly, ongoing stories that remain 
popular in future weeks also are associated with lower sales. 
18 
 
 The patterns in popularity are also reflected in the impact of our measures for novelty. 
Note the frequency measure of novelty ranges from 0 (appears in every single issue of the 
magazine) to 1 (appears only once). A shift in novelty from 0 to 1 effectively doubles the 
newsstand sales of the magazine. Although for context, it is important to note that single copy 
sales account for only about 5% of total circulation, and while we looked at the impact of these 
variables on changes in subscription numbers, the imprecise timing of our measures made it 
difficult to say anything conclusive. 
 Column 4 adds story level variables for the average novelty and average popularity of all 
the keywords associated with a given issue of a magazine. We find that the story level variables 
actually have most of the explanatory power, and therefore, we conduct the remainder of the 
analysis in the paper where one observation equals a single magazine issue. 
 Table 5 presents the same single issue sales figures regressed now on average novelty and 
average popularity of all the keywords associated with each issue’s cover story, so that an 
observation is now at the issue level. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of your competitors 
choices on sales, both in terms of whether they choose to report on the same keywords (any 
matches and average matches), and on the impact of the popularity of what your competitor is 
covering. To facilitate comparison, Columns 1 and 2 focus only on Time and Newsweek so that 
we have a well-defined single competitor. Even early in our dataset in 2001, Time and 
Newsweek had much higher circulation and by the end of our dataset in 2009, US News 
effectively exited the market. Coverage by your competitor of an especially popular event helps 
own sales, even after controlling for cyclical time trends, and similarity of coverage. This 
suggests that when both magazines cover the same popular story, then both see an increase in 
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sales, but when your competitor is covering a popular story that perhaps the public is tired of, it 
also helps sales to cover something different. 
 Columns 3 and 4 attempt to examine the effect of market structure on our analysis by 
splitting data before and after 2006. The year 2006 represents a shift for all three news 
magazines, when both single copy sales and circulation after a decade of steady revenues, begins 
to decline, most notably for US News, as consumers switched over to online news. Consistent 
with this trend, the impact of popularity on sales decreases by half in 2006 (the coefficient on 
PopW-1 falls from 709 to 352), and the life span of a story becomes even shorter. Before 2006, a 
story that was popular the week after publication (PopW) would still generate increased sales, 
whereas after 2006, stories that are still popular the week after 2006 are associated with 
significantly less customer interest. Similarly, we find that the beneficial effects of coverage of a 
novel story only existed before 2006. Cover stories of novel stories after 2006 hurt newsstand 
sales. 
 
Dynamics of novelty and popularity 
 Table 6 now considers trends in novelty and popularity over time. Specifically we see 
whether novelty and popularity of this week’s cover story is positively or negatively correlated 
with the novelty and popularity of the story covered last week. We also consider how the novelty 
and popularity for one magazine is related to the novelty and popularity of coverage by its 
competitors. 
 The theory predicts that we should see oscillation between novelty and popularity. A 
novel story should be followed by a popular story, and vice versa. We can think of the editor’s 
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task as selecting from a menu of different events in the news, each with their own novelty and 
popularity score, and deciding which to put on the cover. 
 One concern for these regressions is the endogeneity problem from using novelty and 
popularity one week to predict novelty and popularity the following week, because the novelty 
and popularity of keywords are highly correlated across weeks when the same keywords are 
reported on. We stick to the frequency measure of novelty here to avoid some of the mechanical 
relationship between novelty and popularity. We will also use our MTurk worker assessments of 
story’s novelty and popularity as instruments to circumvent endogeneity concerns. 
 Here we find little support for our main hypothesis, but endogeneity clearly plays a role. 
Instead we find evidence for positive serial correlation in coverage of popular coverage from 
week to week. From Column 1, I am less likely to cover a novel story if I covered a popular story 
last week. Instead, from Column 4, I am more likely to cover a popular story if I covered a 
popular story, although the correlation is small. The coefficient on the previous weeks popularity 
is 0.11 in Column 4. Perfect positive serial correlation would imply that coefficient should be 
1.0. Columns 2 and 5 attempt to see how editors respond both to what their competitors (in this 
case either Time or Newsweek) are doing in the same week, or what they did in the previous 
week. Here we find that the serial correlation in popularity is half due to what each magazine did 
itself in the previous week but half due to editors echoing the choices of their competitors when 
it comes to popular stories. Finally, Columns 3 and 6 try to account for the endogeneity by using 
the survey measures of novelty and popularity collected from MTurk as first stage instruments 
for our keyword based measure. However, given the weakness of our instruments, these 
estimates are suspect, but they do suggest caution when interpreting the other estimates in this 
Table. 
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 Finally Table 7 considers what determines whether firms cover the same story as their 
competitor. We are essentially asking whether a magazine is choosing to imitate the reporting of 
their competitor, or to innovate, by reporting on a novel story of their own. Here we use the 
Change in Popularity Measure for Novelty to avoid the mechanical association between having a 
low frequency keyword and a low probability of matching that keyword to your competitor. 
While nothing predicted whether there was a keyword match (perhaps because this occurred 
90% of the time), the average number of keyword matches was strongly predicted by the novelty 
of the news story. This is consistent with the model’s prediction that in a competitive 
environment, firms wind up pooling on the same story that maximizes consumer utility. This 
relationship breaks down after 2006. However, it is hard to attribute this to any one of the many 
shifts to the market that occurred during this time. 
 
Other specifications 
 Other specifications that were considered but are not yet reported here include 
regressions for change in paid subscription instead of newsstand sales; probit/logit regressions 
for indicator dependent variables; sub-samples of only keywords that referred to people or 
geographic location; other measures of novelty; sub-samples that excluded the 20 most popular 
keywords that accounted for approximately 1/3 of the keywords in the dataset; specifications that 
included keyword fixed effects; specifications in logs rather than levels. All showed similar 
patterns to the results reported here.
10
 
  
                                                          
10
 Tables for such specifications available upon request. 
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Conclusions 
 We have introduced a theoretical model of how news providers choose to cover different 
news stories based on how novel or popular those stories are amongst the general public. We 
used this model to construct a dataset that measures the novelty and popularity of the cover 
stories of the major news weeklies between the years 2001 and 2009, based on the keywords that 
describe those stories. We validated our keyword based measures of novelty and popularity by 
having Mturk workers code the cover stories. This time period is also unique as it encompasses a 
period of major change in the market structure of the news industry as major newspapers and 
magazines begin to exit the market given the rise of online news. 
 We find that our measures of novelty and popularity do a surprisingly good job in 
predicting news stand sales; our regression models explain 65 to 70% of the variation. We also 
find that consumers care about novelty and popularity, and that they consider the coverage of 
both major news providers when making purchase decisions. We find that consumers do like 
coverage of popular stories, but that popularity only helps for one to two weeks. We find 
evidence that the average lifespan of popular stories have declined since 2006 to under one week, 
and that novelty has lost its effectiveness at selling magazines. The data is less clear in 
explaining how editors choose their stories, but we find evidence that magazines tend to follow 
popular stories with another popular story, and that before 2006, news magazines were likely to 
pool on novel stories, but that this pattern disappears after 2006. 
 We consider this analysis exploratory and hope it inspires future research. The model 
provides a systematic method to think about content analysis in the news market, and we 
construct and validate one way to measure the attributes of novelty and popularity in weekly 
news magazines. 
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 Novelty and popularity have natural analogues in a broader industrial organization 
context. Producing a novel story can be thought of as innovation, while producing a popular 
story can be thought of technological transfer or network effects. The news media is an industry 
with consumption externalities and externalities from innovation. One consumer’s consumption 
of a news story makes it more popular and therefore increases its value to other news consumers. 
Similarly, once one news provider breaks a new story, others can imitate the news provider who 
broke the story without doing as much work. By studying the behavior and strategies of news 
content providers who make these innovation decisions daily, we have access to much higher 
frequency data than would be available in other industries. Industries with similar externalities 
such as software or fashion, might follow similar patterns, and so the findings here can offer 
insight into innovation more generally. 
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Table 1. Most popular keywords. 
Keyword Freq. Percent 
American history 32 3.40 
Bush, George W 63 6.27 
Candidates 50 5.31 
History 35 3.72 
Hospitals 13 1.38 
Iraq 45 4.78 
Leadership 13 1.38 
Obama, Barack 36 3.72 
Personal profiles 86 9.14 
Political campaigns 35 3.72 
Politics 68 7.23 
Presidential elections 57 6.06 
Presidents 65 6.91 
Ratings & rankings 17 1.81 
Terrorism 64 6.80 
US 113 12.01 
United States 149 13.71 
Total 941 100.00 
Keywords were collected using Proquest’s keywords for the cover stories of the three main news 
weeklies. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics. 
 
Time Newsweek US News 
Single copy 154266.5 134288.9 40305.43 
Sales (135415.6) (101048) (13387.81) 
Novelty by 0.2916 0.2448 0.2917 
Frequency (.3495) (.3346) (.3552) 
Novelty by 0.1643 0.1552 0.0896 
ΔPopularity (.6999) (.6683) (.5702) 
PopW−2 
83.6854 91.0362 113.0749 
(196.8287) (190.8573) (238.7587) 
PopW−1 
91.915 96.6825 118.1569 
(204.2947) (190.9574) (240.3179) 
PopW 
92.3909 94.4823 110.2085 
(208.5375) (189.2293) (225.9574) 
PopW+1 
89.5438 90.6137 108.0736 
(209.1717) (183.7618) (220.6022) 
PopW+2 
86.9227 88.59 110.2072 
(208.5702) (181.8956) (223.2582) 
Any matches 
0.8524 0.8524 
 
(0.3549) (0.3549) 
 
Average 0.3708 0.3708 
 
Matches (0.3022) (0.3022) 
 
Observations 4568 5564 7144 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Novelty for each cover story was measured both by how frequent it showed up in the data and by 
the change in popularity of the keywords associated with that story. Popularity was measured by 
the frequency those keywords appeared in Proquests database of daily newspapers in the 
preceding and proceeding weeks subscripted as W-tW-t. Similarity was assessed by comparing 
the number of keyword matches between Time magazine and its main competitor Newsweek. 
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Table 3. Validating the novelty and popularity measure. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Novelty by 
frequency 
Novelty by 
ΔPopularity 
Any match 
keywords 
Avg matches 
keywords 
Novelty (1–5 scale) 
−0.0131*** 0.00666* 
  
(0.00173) (0.00351) 
  
Interestingness (1–5 
scale) 
0.0110*** −0.000287 
  
(0.00149) (0.00303) 
  
Newsworthiness (1–5 
scale) 
−0.00448*** 0.00435 
  
(0.00153) (0.00311) 
  
Similarity (1–5 scale)   
0.0322*** 0.0809*** 
  
(0.0106) (0.00877) 
Constant 
0.301*** 0.0937*** 0.822*** 0.265*** 
(0.00841) (0.0171) (0.0196) (0.0162) 
Observations 16,589 16,589 1230 1230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.064 
 
Here we compare our keyword-count based measures of novelty and similarity on survey 
measures collected from online survey takers. Each article was rated twice to allow for cross 
validation, to assess each article’s novelty, interestingness, newsworthiness, and similarity. We 
regress our keyword-count based measures of novelty and similarity on survey takers 
assessment. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
*** p < 0.01. 
*   p < 0.1. 
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Table 4. Single copy sales on popularity and novelty. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Single copy 
sales 
Single copy 
sales 
Single copy 
sales 
Single copy 
sales 
PopW−2 
−214.6*** −169.2*** −177.9*** 20.13 
(14.55) (16.01) (15.29) (17.51) 
PopW−1 
225.2*** 175.6*** 187.2*** −21.82 
(19.69) (20.99) (19.95) (22.96) 
PopW 
163.1*** 159.1*** 135.5*** −0.0871 
(22.76) (22.73) (21.60) (25.15) 
PopW+1 
−71.59*** −63.58*** −68.33*** −1.518 
(22.57) (22.57) (21.43) (24.61) 
PopW+2 
−83.26*** −81.78*** −67.69*** 2.460 
(15.00) (14.99) (14.34) (16.57) 
Novelty by 
 
−1646 −4549** −2126 
Frequency 
 
(1955) (1870) (1829) 
Novelty by 
 
7620*** 7051*** 3860*** 
ΔPopularity 
 
(1133) (1075) (1054) 
Average 
   
−603.2*** 
PopW−2 
   
(28.47) 
Average 
   
597.6*** 
PopW−1 
   
(38.13) 
Average 
   
418.0*** 
PopW 
   
(45.59) 
Average 
   
−140.6*** 
PopW+1 
   
(46.92) 
Average 
   
−222.8*** 
PopW+2 
   
(31.94) 
Year and month 
controls 
No No Yes Yes 
Magazine controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,161 16,161 16,161 16,161 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643 0.644 0.682 0.698 
In this table regresses the number of single copy sales (e.g. sales at newsstands) on our measures 
of novelty and popularity. Each observation is at the keyword level, standard errors are 
clustered by issue. We include measures of the popularity of the cover story keyword from two 
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weeks before to two weeks after the cover story was published. We first consider a specification 
without novelty to because of co-linearity concerns. Adding time fixed effects in Column 3 does 
not change estimates. Column 4 adds the average popularity of all off the keywords used in the 
cover of that issue. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
∗p < 0.1. 
*** p < 0.01. 
** p < 0.05. 
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Table 5. Single copy sales on competitor’s novelty and popularity. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Single copy 
sales 
Single copy 
sales 
Single copy sales 
before 2006 
Single copy sales 
after 2006 
PopW−2 
−676.4∗∗∗ −545.4∗∗∗ −891.9∗∗∗ −70.29 
(159.2) (187.2) (132.0) (130.2) 
PopW−1 
515.4∗∗ 357.4 709.9∗∗∗ 352.5∗∗∗ 
(202.3) (229.7) (179.6) (129.5) 
PopW 
174.4 206.6 233.0∗ −255.2∗∗∗ 
(140.8) (141.7) (131.3) (84.56) 
Novelty by 
 
−7,312 −15,864 4,310 
Frequency 
 
(19,369) (17,851) (11,015) 
Novelty by 
 
15,343 26,074∗∗∗ −16,028∗∗ 
ΔPopularity 
 
(11,686) (10,034) (7,426) 
Any Matching −5,925 −1,425 −3,715 −1,452 
Keywords (12,467) (12,924) (11,842) (6,518) 
Average # of −3,801 −15,355 −1,377 8,592 
Matching 
keywords 
(17,319) (19,119) (15,265) (8,676) 
Competitor’s −843.7∗∗∗ −664.2∗∗∗ 
  
PopW−2 (159.1) (187.0) 
  
Competitor’s 877.2∗∗∗ 706.2∗∗∗ 
  
PopW−1 (154.0) (181.2) 
  
Comp novelty 
 
−3,460 
  
Frequency 
 
(19,428) 
  
Comp novelty 
 
21,036∗ 
  
ΔPopularity 
 
(11,636) 
  
Month/year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls 
    
Magazine Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls 
    
Observations 791 791 874 434 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.713 0.714 0.691 0.850 
In this table regresses single copy sales of a magazine on the popularity and novelty of the 
keywords of its cover story and the popularity and novelty of the cover story of its competitor. 
Here an observation is at the issue level, and we focus only on Time and Newsweek so that 
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“competitor” is well defined. We also include a measure of similarity of cover stories by 
counting the number of matching keywords. 
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Table 6. Trends in novelty and popularity. 
 
(1) (2) (5) (3) (4) (6) 
 
Novelty (by 
frequency) 
Novelty (by 
frequency) 
Novelty (by 
frequency) 
PopW−1 PopW−1 PopW−1 
Previous issue’s 
novelty (by 
frequency) 
0.000823 −0.00421 0.773** −9.618 −2.055 54.57 
(0.0316) (0.0427) (0.351) (15.48) (18.22) (197.0) 
Previous issue’s 
PopW−1 
−0.000137** −1.05e−05 0.00169 0.204*** 0.112*** −0.824 
(6.14e−05) (8.89e−05) (0.00123) (0.0301) (0.0379) (0.691) 
Competitor’s 
novelty (by 
frequency) 
 
0.122*** 
  
−18.30 
 
 
(0.0426) 
  
(18.19) 
 
Competitor’s 
PopW−1 
 
−0.000185* 
  
0.237*** 
 
 
(9.65e−05) 
  
(0.0412) 
 
Competitor’s 
previous issue’s 
novelty (freq) 
 
−0.0681 
  
−33.49* 
 
 
(0.0425) 
  
(18.16) 
 
Competitor’s 
previous issue’s 
PopW−1 
 
−0.000356*** 
  
0.130*** 
 
 
(8.80e−05) 
  
(0.0376) 
 
Magazine controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month/year 
controls 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Instrumental 
variables 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1191 638 1144 1191 638 1144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.723 
 
0.519 0.575 
 
Here we consider how novelty and popularity evolve over time. Columns (1) and (2) examine 
how the current issue’s novelty, depends on the novelty and popularity of the cover story from 
the previous issue, and on the novelty and popularity of the cover stories published by its 
competitor. Columns (3) and (4) does the same for the current issue’s popularity. Columns (5) 
and (6) repeats the same using an IV analysis, using MTurk survey data as an instrument. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01. 
** p < 0.05. 
* p < 0.1.  
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Table 7. Similarity with competitor. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Any keyword 
match indicator 
Average number of 
keyword matches 
Average number 
of keyword 
matches 
Average number 
of keyword 
matches 
PopW−1 
0.000218 0.000174 0.000232 1.45e−05 
(0.000488) (0.000361) (0.000441) (0.000623) 
PopW 
0.000120 0.000252 0.000244 0.000311 
(0.000486) (0.000360) (0.000437) (0.000627) 
Novelty by 0.0145 0.0850⁎⁎⁎ 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.00419 
ΔPopularity (0.0294) (0.0218) (0.0241) (0.0475) 
Magazine 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month/year 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 923 923 602 321 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.135 0.097 0.147 0.074 
In this table regresses the similarity of the cover stories between Time and Newsweek on the 
popularity of those stories and the novelty of those stories. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 1a. Profile of news weeklies. 
Sources: time.com, newsweek.com, usnews.com, Audit Bureau of Circulation. 
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Figure 1b. Total paid sales (single copy plus circulation). 
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Figure 2. Example MTurk survey questions. Sample questions given to online survey 
participants to assess novelty and popularity of stories. 
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Figure A1. Newspaper database. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. It will be helpful to define the market share, s(t), of firm i defined as the 
fraction of consumers who choose news provider i at time t. If   is the news story covered by 
firm i and  ' is the news story covered by firm i’s competitor, where G is the c.d.f. of the 
difference of the noise parameter,  , then 
                          
                       
   
                                            
      
      (5) 
                                     
 Since the c.d.f. is an increasing function, the firm’s market share, and hence profits are 
increasing in the utility its news coverage provides for consumers. At any time, s, backward 
induction allows us to consider only the Nash Equilibrium of that stage game, and furthermore, 
given that firms in Nash Equilibrium treat the behavior of others as a constant, and the fact that 
consumers are ex ante homogeneous, we can think of firms as choosing the news coverage that 
maximizes consumer utility (see Fig. A1). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking first order conditions, the firm chooses the event   to satisfy  
(6) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
        = 0 
 
 If we let consumer utility be Cobb-Douglas between the popularity and the novelty of the 
news event consumed  
(7) 
               
 
then we can show that the firm either chooses a corner solution by choosing the most novel story 
available, where      , or the firm selects an interior solution       where the relative rate of 
change between popularity and novelty equals a negative constant: 
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(8) 
     
     
    
    
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Standard maximization theory tells us that two conditions that are 
necessary for a corner maximum (i.e. a novelty strategy), (1) that the value function is increasing 
at the corner and (2) the second order conditions are not satisfied at the point where the first 
order condition equals zero. 
 Note in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility with exponential novelty decay, he first order 
condition is given by 
  
 
       
       
 
 while the second order condition is given by 
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Appendix B. Extensions to theory 
 The theory presented has focused on the simplest case where firms report only on a single 
story, and have no effect on the future popularity of the stories they cover. 
 
B.1. Analysis with endogenous popularity and small or short lived firms 
 Now, instead of assuming that popularity is exogenous, instead, we let popularity depend 
on the amount of coverage in previous periods. To that end, we assume that in every period, 
firms choose a set of events to cover and a quantity of coverage for each event such that the total 
quantity fits into the space constraints. Each event has some inherent interestingness factor   , 
such that the popularity of any story   at time t is given by the interestingness factor times the 
sum of all prior coverage on that event: 
(9) 
              
     
 
   
 
   
 
 
 To simplify the analysis, assume for now that firms are either short-lived or myopic or 
small relative to the industry, so that they do not consider the impact of their behavior on future 
investments. We will relax this assumption as well in the following section. 
 Again, firms maximize profits by maximizing readership and their readers’ utility from 
their choice of news coverage. 
(10) 
       
   
                    
 
   
                  
  
 Maximizing the above for each     , and using the fact that the utility is separable by 
events, and that novelty is independent of quantity, we can get the following first order condition 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier which represents the shadow cost of space. 
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(11) 
  
     
       
  
  
 
  
     
      
 
From the definition of popularity, we get 
  
     
     and assuming again that utility is Cobb-
Douglas, we can simplify the above to get: 
(12) 
      
   
  
      
 
B.2 Possible extensions 
 In the previous sub-section, we assumed simultaneous action and myopic play. We could 
also introduce sequential news coverage, with a Stackleberg leader and follower at each time. 
The model can also be generalized with monopolistic and oligopolistic competition, with 
endogenous popularity and with the firms each producing a bundle (vector) of news stories each 
period each with different costs. We are still exploring the model’s implications such as those on 
welfare. Thus far, the model has focused on symmetric firms, but by adding in asymmetry, we 
can draw a link to the literature on horizontal and vertical differentiation.  
